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Abstract 
The essay is a comparative analysis of APEC and the EU, which looks at the particular 
sorts of economic orders these institutions are helping to create. It is  argued that the two 
regions display some noteworthy differences that result from different approaches to the 
problem of economic governance. These differences reflect much more than the relative 
degree and level of regional institutionalisation; they flow from different ‘political 
rationalities’ that are themselves a function of the very different liberal and illiberal 
polities in Europe and East Asia. Our key theoretical innovation is to use the framework 
of political rationality to explain different regional approaches to economic governance; 
more specifically we argue that the EU and the East Asian members of APEC may be 
understood as respectively subscribing to broadly conceived liberal and cameralist 
approaches to economic governance which are in turn reflected in the design of regional 
institutions. 
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Introduction 
While it is far too soon to judge what the long-term implications of the recent economic 
crisis in East Asia may be, the short-term impact of the turmoil has been to generate 
renewed interest in the region’s distinctive political, economic and social structures. The 
problems of the East Asian region serve to highlight how distinctive some of its key 
institutions are, and how they differ from those of North America or Europe. Clearly, the 
East Asian model of regionalism as evidenced in the formation and operation of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum differs considerably from the European 
Union (EU) model. In comparison with the EU, the APEC forum faces a much more 
complex, fractured, diverse political and economic regional environment. In what 
follows, we examine the nature of the differences between ‘European’ and ‘Asian’ forms 
of regionalism with a view to contributing to the development of a comparative 
regionalism. Although we do not attempt any detailed prognostications about the future 
of either region, we argue that East Asia’s development—about which there is currently 
so much speculation—will necessarily reflect current political and economic structures. 
To develop our comparative analysis of the EU and APEC we employ two key 
conceptual tools. The first is relatively uncontroversial, well established and draws upon 
various forms of institutional theory. The second—political rationality—has previously 
been employed primarily in post-structural and sociological writing and is not as yet 
widely influential in political economy but is, nevertheless, a useful adjunct to 
contemporary theorisation . 
We shall begin our theoretical scene-setting by first noting two important features of 
regional institutions. First, while the type or extent of institutionalisation is no doubt an 
important source of variation in regional forms, the emphasis on institutionalisation as 
the dominant explanation of regional diversity betrays the influence of the EU model of 
regional governance on theorising. Implicit in this uni-modal evolutionary conception is 
the notion that the EU represents the end point of institutional processes at the regional 
level. In contrast, the argument proposed in this paper is that institutionalisation masks 
deep-seated differences in patterns of regional governance; the extent of 
institutionalisation is a manifestation—not an explanation—of these differences. Our 
argument is that regional dynamics are embedded in broader political and economic 
contexts and that these are likely to produce different trajectories of regionalism in 
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‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’.  
The second point to make is that East Asia and Europe are characterised by very 
different levels of what Amin and Thrift (1994:14) call ‘institutional thickness’. This 
concept refers to the number, variety and inter-connectedness of institutions that exist 
within a nation or region, and also to the ‘social atmosphere’ that pervades them. 
Importantly, institutional thickness directs attention to process rather than simply to 
structure, and is suggestive of commonalties of practices and values that underpin the 
pursuit of national of regional purposes. We shall argue that the EU has been able to 
govern ‘at a distance’ partly because this reflected a normative preference for the more 
untrammelled operation of market mechanisms, but also because this process was 
facilitated by the existence of a rich infrastructure of non-state institutions at the trans- 
and sub-national level, which in turn reflect the dominance of liberal norms and 
practices. In East Asia, by contrast, not only is this institutional infrastructure of non-
state policy communities and non-governmental agencies less developed, but there is 
also much less enthusiasm for undirected market activities per se. Furthermore, the 
nexus between the private and public sectors in East Asia means that the creation of 
markets regarded as a highly politicised process directly connected to individual 
governments; furthermore, this implies that any diminution of this contingent 
relationship poses a direct threat to the existent political order and its associated 
distributional coalitions.  
These broadly different processes and degrees of institutionalisation have led to, and 
permitted, distinctive approaches to governance. In particular, it is argued that the 
development of the EU and APEC  has been informed by distinctive ‘political 
rationalities’, leading to different agendas, norms, and practices within the two bodies. 
Although the prevailing political rationalities are the subject of contestation—especially, 
but not exclusively, within APEC—there are sufficient emerging commonalties of 
approach within both organisations to make such a broad brush distinction meaningful. 
In what follows, we shall demonstrate how distinctive political rationalities have 
provided templates for institutional development in the EU and APEC and—equally 
importantly—informed highly distinctive approaches to the problems of economic 
governance in Europe and the East Asian region in particular. We shall argue that our 
approach allows us to not only suggest why different approaches prevail within regions, 
but also why competing political rationalities are likely to prove contentious within a 
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trans-regional institution like APEC. 
In the first part of the paper we develop a theoretical framework within which to situate 
the subsequent discussion of the EU and APEC. WE conclude by attempting to draw out 
the theoretical implications of our analysis and consider what they may tell us about 
future regional institutionalisation in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.  
Political Rationalities  
Given the greater political and economic interaction between individual nation states in 
the contemporary era, the development of trans-national institutional structures external 
to the state with which to manage such relationships is perhaps unsurprising. Indeed, an 
influential strand of predominantly North American scholarship suggests that increased 
international cooperation is both functionally necessary and highly rational (Keohane 
1984). There is, however, an implicit, normative teleology and Eurocentrism in this view 
which obscures important regional variations in the development of transnational or 
multilateral institutions; it is important to emphasise at the outset that there is no 
inevitability about precisely which principles will underpin any transnational body. On 
the contrary, the overarching rules, principles, and approaches to political and economic 
governance that any putative international institution embodies will be the product of 
contestation and reflect contingent political realities. A useful way of thinking about 
both the specificity of national political practice and the construction of an overarching 
transnational regime is to consider them as reflective of, and contributing to, distinctive 
political rationalities. 
Rose and Miller (1992) suggest that there are three major components of political 
rationalities. First, political rationalities have a ‘moral’ form which defines both ‘the 
fitting powers and duties for authorities’. Rose and Miller consider that such a 
formulation could be applied to a range of authorities—spiritual, military, pedagogic and 
familial—but it is principally political authority which with we are concerned. The 
moral component of a political rationality helps determine the principles upon which 
governmental authority is exercised, and the aims and objects to which it is directed. In 
short, it determines the principles upon which power is exercised and the legitimacy of 
authority. The second component of political rationality is its ‘epistemological’ 
character, or the predominant understanding of the objects to be governed. One of the 
key debates highlighted, but not confined to the Asia Pacific, centres on questions about 
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the most appropriate and effective forms of capitalist organisation. This is not something 
restricted simply to the moral aspect of a political rationality, but also concerns the way 
the objects of governance themselves are understood. While this is frequently presented 
as a ‘technical’ debate about the relative efficiency of competing forms of economic 
organisation, it is, as we shall see, deeply bound up with questions of political legitimacy 
and authority, and the economy itself as an object of governance. Hence, the third 
characteristic of a political rationality—its rhetorical or discursive aspect—is especially 
critical, as it provides ‘a kind of apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way 
that it is amenable to political deliberations’ (Rose & Miller: 1992: 179).  
We suggest that the EU and the East Asian members of APEC may be understood as 
respectively subscribing to broadly conceived  liberal and cameralist approaches to 
economic governance. Liberal and cameralist constitutions of the economy can be 
understood using the classifications developed above in terms of differences in moral 
purpose, epistemology, and discourse:  
i) Moral purpose. Within a liberal framework the market is identified with the 
freedom and rationality of the individual, whereas within a cameralist framework 
the market is identified with the goals and objectives of state security. 
ii) Epistemology. Within a liberal political rationality the individual and his or her 
interest is the object of regulation. Therefore, for a market to be constituted 
individual interests must be given juridical or constitutional form, whereas within 
a cameralist framework it is the well being and welfare of the general population 
that is object of regulation; in the other words, the market is an instrument serving 
the welfare of the ‘population’. 
iii) Discourse. Within a liberal framework arguments for regional markets are 
generally framed in terms of liberalising and ‘freeing up’ economic processes, 
whereas within a cameralist framework arguments for regional markets are often 
framed in terms of their ability to contribute to national development and to 
provide security.  
The great advantage of the notion of political rationality as a heuristic model for the 
understanding of patterns of regional integration lies in its recognition of the implicit 
normative principles, codes, and assumptions that often underpin highly technical 
programs of economic governance. As Rose (1988) observes, before an economy can be 
managed it is necessary to conceptualise it as a set of processes and social relationships 
that are amenable to management. The political rationality approach may help us to 
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understand why different discourses and techniques of economic management emerge 
by examining the:  
political, institutional and conceptual conditions which give rise to the formulation 
of different notions of the economy, the ways in which different groupings come to 
hold specific economic beliefs, and the consequences of the economic exigencies 
which have been adopted in economic activity and policy (Rose 1988: 181–2). 
The notion of political rationalities has hitherto been used almost exclusively in a 
European context. By extending the usage of political rationalities and attempting to 
identify other non-Western exemplars, we may facilitate comparative analysis and 
simultaneously provide a more nuanced account of the European experience. Our own 
understanding of the concept of the political rationality approach, and the principal 
conceptual tool underpinning the subsequent analysis is as follows: a political rationality 
refers to an approach to the problem of economic and political governance, informed by 
contingent political forces and economic practices, which reflects and determines 
norms, directs state purposes, constitutes objects of regulation, and which is mediated by 
local institutional  infrastructure.  
The argument of this paper, and indeed the strength of the political rationality 
perspective, is that while economic integration may often be couched in neo-liberal 
terms, its method of application, its instruments, its normative assumptions, and its mode 
of governance, may differ considerably between regions. Indeed the crux of our 
argument is that mundane or highly technical aspects of economic liberalisation serve to 
conceal variable assumptions about the mode and distribution of political power (or 
more generally, sovereignty), and the manner in which the market or ‘the economy’ is 
constituted. In fact, our argument is more specific: the economic orthodoxy of neo-
liberal programs is embedded in distinctive forms of political rationality, and therefore 
the methods and modes of economic regulation, even within a broadly neo-liberal and 
deregulatory agenda, will differ from one region to another.  
In sum, European regional integration is moulded by a broadly liberal political 
rationality. Central to liberal modes of political rationality is the de-centring of 
sovereignty; power is exercised not directly, but through the invention of new forms and 
techniques of indirect regulation. The essence of a liberal political rationality is its 
capacity to direct at a distance. Liberalism, therefore, requires a repudiation of raison 
d’état as rationality of rule in which a sovereign exercises power across a given 
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territorial space. One way of understanding liberal notions of rule is to see its emergence 
as an accommodation between the competing political logic of sovereignty and the 
market.2 As Burchell points out, ‘the objective of a liberal art of government becomes 
that of securing the conditions for the optimal and, as far as possible, autonomous 
functioning of economic processes within society or, as Foucault puts it, of enframing 
natural process in mechanisms of security’ (Burchell et al. 1991: 139). Our argument 
suggests that European integration is an attempt to extend these liberal modes of 
political rationality to the regional level. In effect, regional programs such as the Single 
European Market (SEM) seek to accommodate both the logic of security and economic 
liberty by the invention of indirect forms of economic regulation at the regional level. 
Central to this liberal process is the constitution of European regional economic space as 
an independent and autonomous arena of economic activity. 
In East Asia, by contrast,  market economies have been subordinate to the requirements 
and demands of the political logic of sovereignty or security. In many East Asian 
economies, ‘market making’ and ‘state making’ have been closely linked. Therefore, 
market processes have not been seen as autonomous or ‘natural’ processes but 
instruments for the consolidation of state power. In this context, Asian models of 
capitalism are characterised by the subsumption of markets to the political logic of 
security and order. The economy in this model is a specific but not an autonomous 
sphere or a form of rationality: it is an instrument that contributes to the strength of the 
state.  
The European Union and Liberal Political Rationality. 
Our case study of the EU is intended to demonstrate that the EU is embedded within a 
liberal political rationality. In particular, the liberal understanding of political reason has 
shaped the specific contours and organisational direction of the European Union as it has 
moved towards greater economic integration of product and financial markets. Programs 
of economic integration are not sets of abstract economic principles to be applied in a 
political vacuum; they need to be cast into specific shapes and forms by political 
rationality. Our argument is that this particular cast in the case of the EU is liberal, and 
more specifically, strongly influenced by the social market variant of liberalism. This 
influence is manifested in the following: first, in the move towards a single European 
market, which was strongly influenced by the social market or ordoliberal tradition of 
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German capitalism; second, in the pivotal role played by the principle of harmonisation 
and the consequent growth of regulation through policy networks which in turn is best 
understood within the framework of a liberal social market mode of rationality where 
associational governance has an important role. In brief, the argument is that one of the 
distinctive features of the single market economic program has been the development of 
a political infrastructure of regulation partly effected through policy networks which 
presuppose a set of liberal assumptions about political rule.  
There can be little doubt that the single market program is designed along explicitly pro-
competitive lines. Documents on the single market produced by the European 
Commission (EC) are full of the rhetoric of obstacles, impediments, and barriers to 
trade; the dominant theme in these documents is one of sweeping away the obstacles (or 
deregulation) to a more competitive pan-European economy (Thompson 1992). Of 
course, the impetus for economic integration came from a rapidly changing global 
economy which provided a set of incentives for both firms and states to pursue a more 
vigorous path of economic integration and cooperation. Foremost amongst these 
international pressures was the realisation that Europe was losing its technological and 
competitive edge to Japan and the US (Standholtz & Zysman & 1990). European policy 
makers assumed that the greater economies of scale produced by the single market 
would move some way towards rectifying Europe’s competitive disadvantage vis a vis 
the US and Japan. Moreover, there was a belief amongst European policy makers that 
the single market would allow Europe more leverage for bargaining in international 
trade negotiations. These international political economy factors were clearly of great 
importance in propelling the move towards a European single market. Any comparative 
analysis of APEC and the EU has to concede the importance of these ‘market 
conditions’ in explaining the dynamics of regional economic co-operation. However, 
these factors impact differentially—globalisation theories notwithstanding—on the two 
regions: the move towards the single market in the EU was driven by the perceived need 
to develop a competitive advantage whereas regional economic co-operation within 
APEC—or, to be more precise, APEC’s East Asian members—was driven by the 
perceived need to maintain a competitive advantage. Nevertheless, these international 
market factors only provide an understanding of the initial conditions of economic co-
operation; they are not sufficient to explain the shape and form of this co-operation. 
The hard economic logic of European co-operation may have had a distinct de-
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regulatory resonance but its application was strongly influenced by the German social 
market tradition. This social market tradition stems from a group of jurists and 
economists who came to be known collectively as the ordoliberalen who played an 
intellectually influential role in the construction of the post war German economic state.3 
For these theorists, the market is not a natural or spontaneous entity but a socially 
constructed economic form. Market structures are connected to the rest of society 
through complex juridical tissues. The implication to be drawn, therefore, is that it is 
incumbent on the government to strengthen these interconnected tissues in order to 
organise both society and the market. From this perspective, the markets need to be 
provided with a social and juridical infrastructure. Indeed, whereas ‘for the eighteenth 
century the formalism of law was a recipe for minimal intervention (laissez-faire, in its 
more passive sense), the ordoliberalen envisage an extensive juridical interventionism 
with a vocation to further the game of enterprise-form throughout the social fabric as its 
generalised principle of functioning’ (Gordon 1991: 42). This implicit recognition of the 
potentially corrosive influence of the ‘social body’ on the economic market clearly 
differentiates this social market liberalism from Anglo-Saxon variants. 
The extent to which the social market tradition has influenced the actual development of 
the post war German economy has been the subject of much debate (Dumke 1990). 
However, it is clear that a range of institutional mechanisms have been developed to 
facilitate the construction of a social political infrastructure for the German economy. 
There has been a hesitancy on the part of successive German governments to directly 
manage, intervene, or regulate, this social infrastructure; rather, they have relied on the 
development of far reaching associational networks to manage social institutions that 
regulate the German economy. This associational governance or management often 
takes the form of publicly mandated associations bargaining over a range of economic 
and social issues. The outcomes of these negotiations are given frequently legally 
binding status. Indeed, associations are commonly delegated quasi public functions and 
have clear juridical standing within public law. For example, these ‘publicly mandated 
associations’ often encourage product specialisation by promoting high quality 
standards; similarly, employer and trade union associations prevent low wage 
competition by negotiating industry wide wage standards which are legally binding. 
Perhaps, the most important element of the German model of associational management 
is the system of dual training which is provided and managed by firms, labour, and the 
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state, with the aim of enabling the constant development of a high technical skill base in 
manufacturing industry. The associational management of the political and economic 
infrastructure of the German market has been one of the distinctive elements of the 
social market tradition. 
From this analysis it is possible to identify two major elements of the German social 
market tradition: one is the deep interconnection between the institutional mechanism of 
social regulation and the effective functioning of the market economy; and the other, the 
social infrastructure managed through a form of associational governance. These two 
liberal presuppositions (though of a social market variety) have deeply influenced the 
shape and from of European integration. 
The move towards the European single market has, therefore, been heavily influenced by 
the notion that economic integration must proceed parallel to the development of a social 
Europe. For example, the social charter of the EU is not to be considered in isolation 
from the single market, but as part and parcel of the single process of European 
integration. In other words, the development of social Europe is seen as complementary 
to the development of ‘economic’ Europe. Therefore, while the economic analysis of the 
Commission takes a strongly liberal economic perspective on the virtues of economic 
competition, this is often accompanied by appeals for social solidarity and cohesion. In 
effect, market programs are often qualified by a ‘ … neo-corporatist desire for social 
cohesion, order and solidarity. And this latter position is not one that just pertains to the 
European “social dimensions”; it pervades the Commission’s general pronouncements 
about the economy as much as about social policy, broadly conceived’ Thompson (1992: 
141). Market programs, therefore, are not just a set of abstract principles about the 
benefits of deregulation or the benefits of economic competition, but are framed within a 
more general background of political rationality.  
Associational Regulation. 
A vital principle of the community’s move towards a single market has been the notion 
of ‘harmonisation’, the economic logic of which implies that there should be a common 
regulatory minimum within the European community. In conjunction with this economic 
logic a parallel political logic of harmonisation has seen the emergence of an 
associational and regulatory mode of economic governance; these modes of economic 
management are central to the deregulatory economic agenda of the EU and form a key 
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element in the armoury of liberal governmentality. Therefore, the economic and political 
logic of harmonisation leads to both a particular constitution of a ‘European economic 
space’ (1993)4 as well as a distinctive mode of network or associational regulation of this 
economic space. Of course, following the landmark European Court of Justice decision 
in ‘Cassis de Dijion’, there was a move away from traditional models of harmonisation 
towards the principle of ‘national mutual recognition’. In effect—and the SEM program 
was the end product of this process—there was a determined attempt to build a common 
market on the basis of mutual recognition premised on the acceptance by states of a set 
of common core principles. This entailed more than a simple implementation of a 
package of deregulation because it required a fairly extensive economic and political 
program of economic convergence. 
Economists have defined in detail the standards and criteria required for the convergence 
of European economic structures. The importance of these technical specifications for 
‘European economic markets’ is to constitute a ‘Europe wide space’ as an autonomous 
and independent entity (Barry 1993). But—and this point is vital for our thesis—the 
economic logic of harmonisation and mutual recognition is itself a product of the 
application of a liberal mode of political rationality; behind the technical complexity of 
the European market institutions lie the invisible hand of political rationality. 
It is possible to construe that the policies of harmonisation and mutual recognition as a 
part of a broader deregulatory agenda led by the European Commission. In effect this 
would be to argue that the Commission used the instrument of mutual recognition as a 
way of prising open national markets However, this would be a misreading of the 
political consequences of the EU harmonisation model. Our contention is that the logic 
of the harmonisation model had been to create a distinctive European mode of regulation 
through transnational policy networks. It follows that particular patterns of economic 
order are unsustainable without the development of a parallel political infrastructure. 
Joerges (1996) argues persuasively against an interpretation of the single market 
program and the case law of Article 30 and 36 (the free trade and respect for regulatory 
autonomy of individual states) as evidence of the jurisprudence of deregulation. Rather, 
he suggests that we need to acknowledge the effort of the European legal system to 
accommodate two incompatible objectives and to find a set of rules that allow for 
regulatory pluralism within the context of the framework of single market objectives. He 
argues that the court has established that ‘it seems logical to infer from this ECJ’s 
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(European Court of Justice) case law that no member state can defend its own low 
regulatory standards against a higher level of protection realised in a higher European 
standard’ (Joerges 1996: 21–2). The process of deregulation, therefore, needs to be 
accompanied by an equally complex process of regulation. However, it is important to 
note that this process of regulation takes on a juridical or constitutional form.  
Market deregulation, it appears, needs to be accompanied by the development of an 
effective system of regulation. Harmonisation or national recognition is not sufficient in 
itself to create free trade because important primary powers such as health and safety 
remain the prerogative of member states. For example, free trade in food may lead to the 
adoption by member states of the lowest regulatory safety minimum rather than one that 
provides the most effective standards of risk immunisation for European citizens. 
Myriad other examples can be found; for instance, free trade in pharmaceuticals requires 
uniformity in medical standards. In other words, the single market program revealed the 
existence of regulatory gaps that demanded, intervention by the EU with a degree of 
constitutional reinforcement by the ECJ (Majone 1996).  
This argument would suggest that the implementation of the EU directives necessitates 
the extensive regulation and monitoring of the market. For example, Kreher (1997: 241) 
discussing the role of agencies in the EU, notes that their establishment is an ‘instrument 
of coordinated and supervised monitoring and execution which flows from, and is a 
direct consequence of, the earlier political decision construct a European edifice 
primarily regulated by community legislation’. Whatever form this regulation takes it is 
distinguished by deep and complex vertical and horizontal linkages between private and 
public actors. A common feature of the regulatory state in the EU seems to be the 
development of these collaborative linkages between key state and non-state actors in 
the EU. In brief, the regulatory state in the EU has taken the form of governance 
thorough associational networks or policy networks. 
Policy Networks 
In the absence of a supranational option, the regulatory state in the EU has been 
controlled, in part, thorough a system of policy networks. A useful concept with which 
to understand the nature and dynamics of this regulation through policy networks is the 
idea of ‘interlocking politics’ (see Lehmbruch 1989) initially used to analyse the 
distinctive features of German federal politics. Interlocking politics refers to the vertical 
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and horizontal linkages between state and non-state actors, that increasingly characterise 
policy making in many complex polities. The crucial point about these networks is the 
participation of a range of state and non-state actors. Studies of the EU demonstrate that 
governance or regulation through policy networks is increasingly the preferred form of 
regulation. Indeed as Risse-Kappen notes, governance through policy networks is 
particularly pronounced in those areas or issues regulated by EU policies. He goes on to 
note that ‘the more a particular policy sector has been integrated and the more decisions 
in the area are governed by majority rule, the more likely it is that the policy-making 
process is characterised by transnational and transgovernmental coalitions among 
private, subnational, and supranational actors rather than intergovernmental bargaining.’ 
(Risse-Kappen 1996: 66). In this context particular emphasis needs to be put on the so 
called ‘comitology web’ which brings together various groups of national experts and 
officials in various sectors such as for example, foodstuffs, drugs, health, and safety, 
which are central to the regulation of the single market.5  
Our basic contention is that these modes of governance by policy networks need to be 
understood in terms of the operation of a liberal political rationality. In part, the 
regulation of the European economy and polity through networks is analogous to the role 
of associations in the governance of the German social market. However, at a deeper 
level, policy networks reflect the importance of ‘direction at a distance’ so central to the 
liberal notion of political reason. A liberal view of government requires the separation of 
state and society manifested in the dichotomies between public and private and state and 
civil society. In other words, liberal political reason is not identified with the rationality 
of the ruler who in turn identifies with the state, but with the freedom and rationality of 
members of the political community. In this respect, ‘an essential and original feature of 
liberalism as a principle of governmental reason is that it pegs the rationality of 
government, of the exercise of political power, to the freedom and interested rationality 
of the governed themselves’ (Burchell 1991: 139). 
The operation of policy networks is only possible within this framework of liberal 
political reason. First, policy networks, because they include both state and non-state 
actors, operate at a distance from political authorities. In effect, public authorities 
harness the energies of the public and private sector in the regulation of the single 
market. Consequently, the regulation of conduct—economic or otherwise—remains the 
responsibility and interest of actors outside of the state. Second, central to the operation 
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of liberal political reason in the context of the EU is the notion of the economy (and 
society to a lesser extent) as a natural entity which in turn presupposes the application of 
technical expertise to understand these autonomous processes. Policy networks operate 
to provide these forms of technical expertise and thereby serve to constitute the 
European economy or the single market as an independent and autonomous entity. This 
is an important point that has been given added impetus by recent decisions of the ECJ 
which might seem to suggest an attempt to provide a firmer legal basis for the network 
structures of the EU. For example, ECJ has held that in evaluating the potential ‘risk’ of 
national regulation, due regard needs to be paid to relevant scientific expertise, and 
particularly the findings of international experts and the expert committee of the EU. 
Moreover, ECJ case law suggests that in carrying out these regulatory tasks committees 
are asked to respect the rights of individual (see Joerges & Neyer 1997; Joerges 1996). 
In fact, recent jurisprudence of the ECJ has moved towards the constitutionalisation of a 
form of reflexive regulation which is consistent with the liberal effort to ground political 
rule—or in this case even the rule of technical experts—in the freedom and rationality 
(or interests) of European citizens. Teubner’s (1983) notion of regulated autonomy 
where the state facilitates the development of self regulating systems based on the 
representation of group or collective private interests is particularly apposite in the study 
of the European regulatory state. 
One of the strengths of the political rationality approach to the study of regional 
economic and political process, therefore, is that it enables us to recognise the fact that 
markets are embedded in deeper forms of political rationality. The implication of this 
argument is that the constitution of the European market as an autonomous natural entity 
is a product of the operation of a liberal political process. For example, our analysis 
reveals that the single market program and the associated deregulation of the European 
market runs in parallel with the establishment of an elaborate and sophisticated political 
infrastructure of economic regulation. In effect, without the construction of regulatory 
frameworks and the technical expertise embedded in policy networks, an autonomous 
and independent market in Western Europe would not be possible.  
APEC and Illiberal Political Rationality 
What is most striking about the ‘APEC region’, especially in comparison with the EU, is 
its heterogeneity. Although the differences between APEC’s members are dramatically 
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revealed in the contrasts between, say, Japan and Papua New Guinea, or Canada and 
Indonesia, what is especially interesting here are the differing and competing political 
rationalities that APEC embraces. On the one hand the Anglo-American nations—the 
US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—embrace a form of liberalism that is broadly 
similar to that of the EU. On the other, however, it is possible to identify a very different 
political rationality which, while having its roots in a distinctly East Asian tradition of 
state-led development, is reminiscent of eighteenth century German cameralism (Tribe 
1984). Clearly, there are important differences in a contemporary East Asian context, but 
this broad brush distinction serves to highlight fundamentally differing governmental 
rationales. Unlike its European and Anglo-American counterparts, the East Asian 
approach to governance is predicated upon highly interventionist strategies, which not 
only consider such activities legitimate, but which generate and reflect different, 
structurally embedded relations between state, business, and the wider society of which 
they are a part. In an Asian context, the economy is generally a fundamental component 
in a comprehensive and all-encompassing conception of state security. APEC, therefore, 
must attempt to accommodate both an Anglo-American form of neo-liberalism that is 
closely aligned to the European model, and an Asian form of cameralism. 
The story of APEC’s development and rapid rise to prominence has by now been often 
enough told and need little repetition here (Funabashi 1996; Beeson 1995). What is 
worth re-emphasising, however, is that although increased economic interaction within 
East Asia and (especially) across the Pacific to North America made the development of 
some sort of regional forum with which to manage such relationships more likely, the 
precise form taken by any putative trans-regional organisation was unpredictable. 
Indeed, APEC represents a key site of contestation between ‘Asian’ and ‘Western’ 
governments keen on implementing their own, potentially incommensurate visions for 
APEC. In short, APEC is the location of an unfolding struggle to define a new 
transnational political rationality which will shape both the further institutionalisation of 
APEC itself, as well as the norms and practices that underpin regional patterns of 
economic governance. 
Indeed, it is worth reiterating the point that regions themselves are contested concepts, 
and while the EU might appear a more ‘natural’ institutional reflection of Europe than 
does the APEC of the Asia Pacific, regions in general remain social constructions and 
liable to redefinition (Dirlik 1992). One of APEC’s principal difficulties, and something 
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that sets it apart from the EU, is the lack of congruence between its membership and any 
obvious underpinning commonalties of social, political, or economic form amongst its 
members. Consequently, deciding quite what form APEC should take, and determining 
the extent of its institutional consolidation and authority over members, have become 
crucial issues, especially in an East Asian region which has little history of prior 
transnational institutionalisation. Further complicating this picture is the fact that the 
foreign policy of the United States during the Cold War, which imposed bilateral, rather 
than multilateral relations throughout the region, when combined with distinctive state 
structures and practices in Asia has meant that international institution building in the 
region was inherently more problematic (Katzenstein 1997). 
An important consequence of the APEC region’s historical development, therefore, is an 
absence of ‘institutional thickness’. Unlike the EU, the APEC region does not have a 
vast number of institutions, agencies, and authorities that are either independent of or 
only loosely connected to individual states, at either the transnational or the national 
level. Neither has economic development inevitably led to an expansion of civil society 
(Rodan 1997), or to a concomitant deepening of non-state institutions. Consequently, the 
state is more directly involved in establishing structures of governance. Policy networks 
in the APEC region are, therefore, less developed, especially at the national level. This 
relative lack of trans-regional institutional deepening is reflective of, and helps account 
for, the absence of an overarching, region-wide system of governance. Not only is there 
no common, region-wide political rationality, but there is less capacity for one to be 
transmitted or institutionally embedded. 
 
Economic and Political Insitutionalisation in East Asia 
 
APEC’s Asian members are distinguished by a number of qualities that make 
transnational economic and especially political integration problematic. Not only do the 
political systems of East Asia display some noteworthy differences and deviations from 
the liberal democratic ideal, but they are also often tightly bound up with the distinctive 
patterns of capitalist organisation that characterise the region. Indeed, some of the binary 
oppositions which are central to ‘Western’ political theory—private versus public, state 
versus civil society—have a good deal less relevance in an East Asian setting. Nor is this 
simply an academic nicety. On the contrary, the interaction—or in some instances, the 
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fusion—of what may be broadly described as ‘state’ and ‘capital’ has been central to the 
trajectories of East Asian development, something that even the pro-market World Bank 
(1993: 6) has conceded. The intention here, however, is not to rehearse the somewhat 
sterile debates about the merits of states or markets as optimal determinants of economic 
outcomes. Rather, what we wish to emphasise is that the ‘developmental state’ approach 
pioneered by Japan and emulated to various degrees by successive generations of 
industrialising countries in the region has left structurally embedded distributional 
coalitions in its wake that are constitutive of distinctive, and often illiberal national 
political rationalities (Beeson 1996; Appelbaum & Henderson 1992; Wade 1990; 
Johnson 1982).  
Given the difficulty the East Asian  development model appears to be currently facing it 
might be expected that such economic practices and political relationships will quickly 
lose favour. However, there are embedded political relationships and economic 
structures, in which Japan remains a key actor, which make dramatic change unlikely. 
Japan is exerting an increasingly powerful influence, both directly through its economic 
links in Asia, and more subtly at the ideational level. Japan is not simply the dominant 
source of direct investment in the East Asian region; it also makes considerable 
contributions via its Official Development Assistance (Steven 1996). The coordinated 
utilisation of combined private and public finance has been central to the successful 
migration of Japanese companies into Asia. The most immediate manifestation of this 
process is the replication of Japan’s integrated keitretsu production networks across the 
region. A direct effect of the expansion of Japanese capital has been the establishment of 
close political ties within host nations, cementing the prominent position of Japanese-
style capitalism (Hatch & Yamamura 1996).  
Two further factors suggest Japan’s influence will not disappear rapidly. First, it is 
important not to confuse a banking or financial sector crisis with the performance of 
Japanese industrial corporations more generally: there is nothing to suggest that these 
will not remain competitive and central to the region’s economic and political 
infrastructure. Second, in the longer term, the influence of the Japanese model and its 
associated political relationships has been reinforced by Japan’s increasingly assertive 
position on the international stage. Japan’s economic weight means that it is inevitably 
assuming a more prominent and influential position in key international agencies, like 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which effectively govern 
 18
international commerce (Rapkin & Strand 1997; Wade 1996). It is quite possible that 
East Asia’s economic difficulties will ultimately make the region less enamoured of 
unbridled neoliberalism and more determined to develop an ‘Asian’ response to such 
difficulties (Beeson 1997a). 
The institutionally embedded economic structures and tight linkages that have developed 
between business and government in the region have, therefore, influenced the content 
of public policy and the overarching logic with which it has been shaped and 
legitimated. However, it is important to recognise that if the relationship between the 
public and private sectors is a good deal closer—not to say blurred—in countries like 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, then it is essentially meaningless in some of the third 
tier of developmental states. In Indonesia, for example, the Suharto family has exploited 
its political dominance to amass a vast fortune in which individual family members 
control a range of enterprises across the entire Indonesian economy, including property, 
banking, industry, telecoms, media and transport (Hiscock 1996). The distinction 
between the public and private sectors that underpins the European approach to 
governance is simply not applicable in an Indonesian context. Political control is 
maintained through a form of ‘exclusionary corporatism’ in which functionally 
determined interest groups are tightly bound into overarching state structures, which are 
reinforced by the state-sponsored ideology of ‘Pancasila’ and the dominant state-
controlled political machine, Golkar (MacIntyre 1994). 
In Malaysia, economic and political interests are similarly fused. The United Malays’ 
National Organization (UMNO), which has dominated Malaysian politics since the race 
riots of 1969, is deeply involved in domestic economic activity. Economic development 
in Malaysia has been driven by the desire to promote indigenous ‘Bumiputra’ capitalists, 
resulting in a form of ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ in which state policy has been 
systematically designed to favour the interests of a well-connected élite and a range of 
companies directly controlled by UMNO itself (Gomez 1994). The point to stress here is 
that economic development is not a politically neutral exercise in which the role of 
government is reduced to merely providing the minimal framework within which market 
forces can operate. On the contrary, in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, 
government is directly involved in economic activity and political élites are amongst the 
principal beneficiaries of the energy market economies. The developmental state 
approach not only requires a different ideological underpinning and rationality of 
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government, but it also leads to the institutionalisation of distributional coalitions that 
directly benefit from a specific pattern of governmental rule 
Lest it be supposed that such deviations from a liberal approach to government are 
confined to those states that are more directly concerned with promoting economic 
development where the task of nation-building remains a more pressing, incompletely 
realised project, it is worth considering the case of Singapore. The response of the ruling 
People’s Action Party (PAP) to dramatic rises in Singaporean income levels has been to 
expand the size of the state itself, and to develop new forms of ‘political co-optation’ 
(Rodan 1996). In other words, economic development has not inevitably led to an 
expansion of political space and the development of liberal-democracy, but to a more 
pervasive form of authoritarian corporatism. The Singaporean state, therefore, represents 
a form of governance which is neither liberal, nor at-a-distance. On the contrary, it 
exemplifies an extension of the cameralist logic of a developmental political rationality, 
in which ‘the dominant and intrusive role of state power in most aspects of East and 
Southeast Asian life channels political change to serve the managerial and technocratic 
ends of the state’ (Bell and Jayasuriya 1995:15). A central challenge for any trans-
regional institutional forum, therefore, is to accommodate such fundamentally illiberal 
domestic political practices within its overarching framework. 
APEC’s Accommodating Architecture 
If APEC was restricted to the nations of East Asia it might be expected to more easily 
reflect the integrated nature of political and economic practice in an encompassing 
regional political rationality. However, what distinguishes APEC and sets it apart from 
the EU in particular, is the collision of highly distinctive political and economic patterns 
of organisation, which in turn have generated divergent norms, values, and approaches to 
government. Indeed, the East Asian developmental and/or authoritarian states bear little 
resemblance to the idealised conception of the minimalist state and its concomitant self-
regulating economic order that underpins the Anglo-American approach to government. 
In short, there is little replication of what Ruggie (1993: 172) calls the EU’s 
‘multiperspectival polity’, in which a number of viewpoints are constitutive of national 
and transnational identity.  
In APEC, by contrast, the competing political rationalities of the region’s Asian and 
Anglo-American members lead to some striking paradoxes. Central to the strategic 
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calculations of APEC’s Asian members has been a desire to extend the ‘ASEAN way’, 
or the principles of negotiated consensus and non-interference in domestic affairs that 
have been cornerstones of this important regional sub-group’s approach to transnational 
institution building (Leifer 1996). Indeed, the blueprint for APEC development authored 
by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) specifically rejects the possibility of following the 
European model. Instead it suggests APEC  
will not be a community in the sense of the EC—characterized by acceptance of the 
transfer of sovereignty, deep integration and extensive institutionalization. It will be 
a community in the popular [sic] sense of a ‘big family’ of like-minded 
economies—committed to friendship, cooperation and the removal of barriers to 
economic exchange among members in the interest of all (EPG 1994: 5). 
This permissive approach has been incorporated into APEC’s reformist discourses via 
the ‘flexibility principle’, which effectively allows members to renege on their trade 
liberalisation commitments if it is deemed necessary. Not only are APEC agreements 
consequently voluntary and non-binding, even more significantly, they allow the 
continuation of the sorts of state activism at the domestic level that has characterised 
East Asian economic development. East Asian governments, in other words, support the 
development of a non-interventionist transnational institutional framework, precisely 
because this is most likely to permit the continuation of existing ‘interventionist’ patterns 
of economic and political organisation. Indeed, the most recent APEC meeting in 
Vancouver revealed how impotent APEC was in comparison with the International 
Monetary Fund in attempting to deal with the grouping’s first major crisis.  
The position of the US exemplifies the very different approach of the Anglo-American 
nations. Somewhat paradoxically, the US is actively attempting to construct a legalistic, 
rules-based international regime, which imposes more binding commitments on APEC 
members, as a way of structuring individual national economies. In other words, US 
policy is almost a mirror image of the East Asian approach: government activism at the 
international level is driven by the desire to create a particular form of neo-liberal market 
order in which the state is less directly involved in the ‘national’ economy. However, 
while the withdrawal or minimisation of state’s role in domestic economic regulation 
may have been rendered more feasible in the EU by the creation of the ESM, this is a 
more problematic exercise in APEC in general and East Asia in particular. As we have 
seen, powerful domestic political forces are directly involved in economic activity across 
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Asia, and are consequently deeply implicated in the construction of the specific 
economic orders that prevail within individual nations. The possible ceding of authority 
to APEC by individual nation states is therefore likely to be resisted in East Asia, 
especially where any transnational authority appeared capable of disrupting entrenched 
national distributional coalitions or threatening the essentially cameralist governmental 
rationality. 
This is especially problematic for APEC as its  reform agenda—indeed, APEC itself—
owes much to the activities of various élite groups in government, business and 
academia (Woods 1993), who have provided both the ideas for, and a good deal of the 
impetus behind, an economic reform blueprint that bears the familiar hallmarks of the 
so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ of neoliberal reform (see Williamson 1994). APEC’s 
‘action agenda’, is replete with measures designed to encourage greater ‘transparency’ in 
economic activities, and make competition a greater determinant of economic outcomes. 
While APEC’s institutional precursors—the Pacific Basin Economic Council, the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council, and the Pacific Trade and Development Conference—
were clearly important venues in which regional élites could use international networks 
to promote particular ideas and develop shared understandings, as we have seen, there is 
significant resistance to wholesale neoliberal reform. At one level, this may be ascribed 
to the low levels of transnational institutionalisation in East Asia. As Higgott notes:  
these ideas are not yet institutionalised – neither in the sense that they are embedded 
in norms and principles, nor in the sense that there has developed in the Asia Pacific 
a set of operating procedures and administrative agencies capable of providing a 
strong transmission belt between ideas and policy process (Higgott 1994: 371). 
At a more fundamental level, however, the way international market pressures are 
mediated is taking a highly contingent form that makes thoroughgoing reform or the 
easy transmission of new ideas—especially where they have the potential to threaten the 
existing political and economic order—more difficult. In Malaysia, for example, 
Camroux (1994: 423) suggests that delegates to regional forums are essentially 
representatives of ‘Malaysia Incorporated’, rather than independent members of trans-
regional policy networks. Similarly, in Singapore, participants in international and 
national policy institutes and forums are often little more than conduits for government 
propaganda (Jayasuriya 1994: 417). The point to make here is that the conceptual 
distinctions between government and economy, or state and civil society that underpin 
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the liberal political rationality are often not applicable in East Asia. Not only is the 
institutional infrastructure of policy networks outside the state which facilitate liberal 
governance in the EU not well established in Asia, but the economy itself as an object of 
governance is conceived very differently. There is a more organic relationship between 
state, economy, and population that feeds into and reflects a more encompassing notion 
of security. Consequently, East Asian states remain much more directly involved in 
economic activity generally and in determining the particular sort of market order that 
prevails within national boundaries. 
The Persistence of Difference 
In a region with little history of trans-national institutionalisation, in which integration 
has occurred principally at the economic level, and which has been driven by the private 
sector (Ravenhill 1995), it becomes easier to understand the attraction of the East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC). If there is any intrinsic disposition toward regional 
integration, it is between those countries that are distinguished by a similar 
‘interventionist’ political rationality, an affinity which is being reinforced by the 
activities of Japanese-based transnational companies and government assistance (Hatch 
& Yamamura 1996). In such a context, EAEC provides a more ‘natural’ expression of 
this tendency.  
The lack of congruence or, as we are arguing, the competing political rationalities within 
the Asia Pacific region, help explain the ambiguous and contradictory discourse that 
accompanies APEC’s reform agenda. The rather oxymoronic notion of ‘open 
regionalism’, which encourages unilateral liberalisation and an extension of APEC’s 
benefits to other nations on either a conditional or an unconditional basis, is designed to 
accommodate the interests of both the interventionist East Asians and the US, the latter 
preferring liberalisation to occur on a reciprocal basis. There is more at stake here than 
arcane trade semantics, however. What the notion of open regionalism and associated 
inventions like ‘concerted unilateralism’ point to are fundamental differences about the 
way APEC should operate, which are themselves reflective of divergent governmental 
rationalities and conceptions of economic management. It is the desire to insulate such 
distinctive political practices and forms of economic organisation that accounts for 
APEC’s voluntaristic and consensual approach. The political and economic space which 
APEC encompasses is not nearly as homogenous or self-contained as is the EU’s. 
Consequently, there is even more reason to attempt to insulate domestic practices 
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through national or even sub-regional political structures like EAEC, which offer a 
degree of possible solidarity or mutual support. Significantly, the first post-crisis 
meeting of  ASEAN leaders also included the leaders of China and Japan, giving de-
facto expression to the EAEC grouping (Alford, 1997). 
The potential importance of such factors was recently illustrated when the currencies of 
Southeast Asia came under sustained attack by international financial markets. 
Predicably, it was Malaysia’s Mahathir that was at the forefront of articulating a 
response to this development. At one level Mahathir’s comments could be read as 
simply an extension of the ‘Asian values’ debate, which claims that there are distinctive 
Asian cultural qualities that are different, and often superior to the West, and which need 
to be protected (see Robison 1996). In this context, the destabilisation of Southeast 
Asia’s financial order could be—and was by Mahathir—taken as an attack on Asian 
autonomy and the right to self-determination (Beeson 1997b). What is significant for our 
purposes, however, is that at another level Mahathir’s response is emblematic of a 
suspicion about market-enhancing neoliberal reforms which threaten to directly 
undermine a domestic economic order that is predicated on an illiberal political 
rationality. 
The ‘globalising’ forces of which the financial markets are the archetypal exemplars are 
mediated in different ways within individual countries. While it may be difficult for the 
countries of East Asia to insulate themselves from a generalised pattern of international 
economic restructuring, the historically close relationship between government and 
business throughout East Asia means that the adjustment process will continue to be 
shaped by contingent national institutions. The liberalisation process so far has been 
mediated principally within states and manifest in a shifting balance of power between 
government officials and business groups (Jayasuriya 1995). More fundamentally, it has 
not generated either an inevitable expansion of political liberties or a necessary 
diminution of an illiberal political rationality. 
When viewed through the theoretical framework provided by the political rationality 
approach, then, the contested nature of APEC’s institutionalisation becomes more 
comprehensible. Indeed, the origins of the competition between different forms of 
capitalism and their concomitant patterns of economic, political, and social organisation 
throughout the ‘Asia Pacific region’ is revealed through this methodology. Capitalist 
development and the constitution of regions are neither unilinear nor teleological. 
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Moreover, there is no necessary relationship between markets and particular forms of 
political practice. In other words, the current trauma in East Asia notwithstanding, an 
illiberal political rationality may endure, even in a globalised economic order.  
Concluding Remarks 
A key contention of this paper is that an understanding of the dynamics of regional 
economic cooperation is informed and enriched by utilising the notion of political 
rationality. Given that mainstream approaches to the study of regional cooperation—be 
they realist or liberal institutionalist—often fail to appreciate the normative and 
ideological basis of regionalism, the notion of political rationality helps to clarify the 
context under which regional cooperation takes place. Indeed, much of the current 
debate over the respective virtues of realist as against institutionalist approaches to the 
study of regional cooperation fail to adequately recognise the fact that the concepts and 
tools of international relations are themselves the artefacts of specific understandings of 
state and society or models of political rationality. In other words, the conventional tool 
kit of the analyst of regional cooperation may prove to be inadequate for the analysis of 
the comparative dynamics of regional cooperation. 
The importance of this claim can be seen in the context of East Asia. The constitution of 
economic space in East Asia, we have suggested, has been strongly shaped by cameralist 
forms of rationality. Central to cameralism is the provision of social order and the 
direction of policy towards the property and well being of the nation. As Burchell points 
out, this has a clear resonance with the Aristotelian theme of policy as ‘state house 
keeping’. However, cameralism moves beyond the notion of economy as housekeeping 
to suggest that it involves ‘the application of certain definite governmental techniques to 
defined populations for specific purposes’ (Burchell 1996: 4). From a cameralist 
perceptive, the economy is not an autonomous arena but an instrument to be used to 
further the prosperity of the population which in turn is seen to be vital to the provision 
of social order and security. In effect, the economy is subordinate to the state-defined 
ends of security and order. It is the embeddedness of the economy within the matrix of 
these complex institutional interests which makes it difficult to constitute the economy 
as an arena independent of the state. In contrast to the idea of direction of distance, this 
notion of the economy renders it directly governable in the interests of security.  
To put the matter somewhat differently and more provocatively, if there is an epochal 
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international shift toward a market order of the sort associated with neoliberalism, as 
some commentators have suggested (Gill 1995), then it is a neoliberal economic order 
that is realised in highly distinctive and contingent ways. While the policy documents 
and reformist agendas of both the EU and APEC may be replete with the technicist 
language and rationale of the professional economist, there are significant differences in 
the way such formulations are realised in the two organisations.  
In East Asia, where the position of ruling élites is closely bound up with the existent 
economic structure, the possible constitution of markets beyond the state’s influence as a 
self-regulating sphere, subject only to expert or technical management, is remote. Not 
only does the dense network of institutional infrastructure that permits government at a 
distance in the EU not exist in East Asia, but such a transformation represents a direct 
threat to extant patterns of political and economic power. Expectations about either the 
capacity of APEC or indeed any other regional forum to manage regional crises, or about 
the inevitability of profound political and economic change in the wake of such crises, 
may prove premature. 
The strength of the political rationality approach to the comparative study of the process 
of regional economic integration is that it allows us to focus on not only the different 
modes of market governance, but on the manner in which the economic processes are 
constituted both at the domestic and regional level. Ideological and normative state 
traditions shape the very ethical architecture of the market economy, its normative 
presuppositions, its purposes and ends, and above all, its degree of autonomy from other 
social and political structures. In short, competing political rationalities are deeply 
implicated in the construction, legitimisation, and organisation of distinctive patterns of 
economic activity. 
This general conclusion leads to an interesting paradox: states in East Asia intervene and 
govern economies directly at the state level, while at the same time these very same 
states are vehemently opposed to imposition of any regulation at the regional level. 
Katzenstein (1997) aptly describes this state of affairs as a form of regionalism in 
markets, rather than through formal institutions. While this is an accurate description of 
the absence of trans-regional institutionalisation in the East Asian region, the underlying 
reason for the lack of such a regulatory framework is the failure to constitute an 
independent arena of economic space outside of the state. This failure, in turn, can be 
traced back to the dominance of cameralist forms of political rationality in much of East 
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Asia.  
By contrast, the political rationality perspective suggests that the European form of 
government at a distance is predicated upon very different assumptions and made 
possible by the existence of an extensive institutional infrastructure outside of the state. 
Central to this infrastructure is the strategy of regulation  through policy networks that 
enables both the constitution and governance of interests at a regional or European level. 
Therefore the construction of an autonomous and independent market requires a parallel 
process that governs and directs the interests affected by this process of market building. 
Indeed, in the European context this has often taken the form of explicit juridical 
recognition of these non-state interests. There is, therefore, a direct, if opaque, link 
between a liberal political rationality and the constitution of an independent arena of 
economic space 
Political rationalities, then, are a reflection of the contingent political forces, institutional 
structures and discursive practices that inform policymaking and, ultimately, attitudes to 
international cooperation. Viewed in this light the distinctive patterns of European and 
East Asian political practice and their concomitant forms of institutional development 
become more comprehensible. International institution building and cooperation is 
neither teleological nor simply a technical exercise, but shaped by a range of national 
political and economic structures that permit as well as constrain possible outcomes. 
Without the dense infrastructural framework of policy communities and non-state 
agencies that exist in the EU, a liberal political rationality and government at a distance 
would be both less feasible and less attractive. The political rationality approach 
suggests that reproducing such a mode of governance in the APEC region will not 
simply be a daunting technical problem, therefore, but will also face a more direct 
political challenge from political forces and economic actors whose position is 
dependent upon existing patterns of state authority. 
 
Notes 
1. This is a revised version of a paper of a paper presented at a Conference on non state actors in the 
global system held at the University of Warwick, and a seminar the University of Allborg. Our thanks 
to Johannes Schmidt and Jacques Hersh for providing the opportunity for a stimulating discussion at 
Aalborg. We also wish to acknowledge the constructive and valuable comments from Richard Stubbs 
and Ann Firth. The standard disclaimer applies.  
2. Indeed, the works of Foucault (e.g., in Burchell et al. 1991), Pocock (1985), and Hirschman (1977), 
albeit from different perspectives, have noted that the growth of commerce posed a unique set of 
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problems for traditional conceptions of sovereignty (Foucault) or republican citizenship (Pocock). 
3. For a survey of the social market tradition see Thompson (1992). 
4. Barry’s work is an impressive attempt to use the political rationality approach for the understanding of 
harmonizaton. He recognises—and he is the first to do so—the importance of the role played by 
‘direction at a distance’ in the European region. However, our argument differs from his in that we 
emphasise the role played by non-state actors in the regulation of the market, and the importance of 
juridification of interests in the constitution of the market. 
5. For survey of these committees see Joerges & Neyer 1997).  
References 
Alford, Peter (1997) ‘Persistent Mahathir at last on a winner’, The Australian, December 17, p 8. 
Amin, Ash and Nigel Thrift (1994) ‘Living in the global. In A. Amin & N Thrift (eds), 
Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1–22. 
Appelbaum, Richard P. and Jeffrey Henderson (eds) (1992) States and Development in the Asian 
Pacific Rim, Newbury Park: Sage. 
Barry, Andrew (1993) ‘The European community and European government: harmonization, 
mobility and space’, Economy and Society 22 (3): 314–26. 
Beeson, Mark (1997a) ‘And never the twain shall meet’, The Australian, October 10, p .11. 
— (1997b) ‘In the grip of global finance’, The Age, August 7, p. 15. 
— (1996) ‘Asia’s disparate political economies and the prospects for transnational 
“convergence’”, Asian Journal of Public Administration, 18 (2), 141–67 
— (1995) ‘Australia, APEC, and the politics of regional economic integration’, Asia Pacific 
Business Review 2 (1): 1–19. 
Burchell, Graham (1991) ‘Peculiar interests: civil society and governing “the system of natural 
liberty”’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect, Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, pp. 119–50  
Bell, Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka (1995) ‘Understanding illiberal democracy: a 
framework’, in D.A. Bell et al. Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, New York: 
St Martin’s Press, pp. 1–67. 
Camroux, David (1994) ‘The Asia Pacific policy community in Malaysia’, The Pacific Review 7 
(4): 421–34. 
Dirlik, Arif (1992) ‘The Asia-Pacific idea: reality and representation in the invention of regional 
structure’, Journal of World History 3 (1): 55–79. 
Dumke R .H (1990) ‘Reassessing the Wirtshaftswunder. reconstruction and post war growth in 
West Germany in international context, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 52 
(2): 451–95. 
Eminent Persons Group (1994) Achieving the APEC Vision: Free and Open Trade in the Asia 
Pacific, Singapore: APEC. 
Funabashi, Yoishi (1995) Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in Apec, Washington: Institute for 
International Economics. 
 28
Gill, Stephen (1995) ‘Globalisation, market civilisation, and disciplinary neoliberalism’, 
Millennium 24 (3): 399–423. 
Gordon, Colin (1991) ‘Government and Rationality: an Introduction’. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon 
& P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect, Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 1–52. 
Hatch, Walter, and Kozo Yamamura (1996) Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a Regional 
Production Alliance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Higgott, Richard. (1994) ‘Introduction: ideas, interests, and identity in the Asia-Pacific, The 
Pacific Review 7 (4): 367–80. 
Hirschman, Albert (1977) The Passions and the Interests, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hiscock, G (1996) ‘Wealth Sprouts on Suharto Family Tree’, The Australian, October 10: 25–
29. 
Jayasuriya, Kanishka (1995) ‘The political economy of democratization’, in D.A. Bell et al. 
Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, New York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 107–33. 
— (1994) ‘Singapore: the politics of regional definition’, The Pacific Review 7 (4): 411–20. 
Johnson, Chalmers (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industry Policy 1925-
1975, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Joerges, Christian (1996) ‘Taking the law seriously: on political science and the role of law in the 
process of European integration’, European Law Journal 2 (2): 106–35. 
Joerges, Christian and Jurgen. Neyer (1997) ‘From intergovernmental bargaining to deliberative 
political process: the constitutionalization of comitology’, European Law Journal 3: 3 
1–27. 
Kreher, Alexander (1997) ‘Agencies in the European community – a step towards administrative 
integration in Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 4 92): 225–45. 
Katzenstein, Peter J. (1997) ‘Introduction: Asian regionalism in comparative perspective’, in P.J. 
Katzenstein & T. Shiraishi (eds), Network Power: Japan and Asia, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 1–46. 
Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lehmbruch, Gerhard (1989) ‘Institutional linkages and policy networks in the federal system of 
Germany’, Publius: Journal of Federalism 19 (2): 21–35. 
Leifer, Michael (1996) ‘The ASEAN regional forum’, Adelphi Paper 302. London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. 
MacIntyre, Andrew (1994) ‘Organising interests: corporatism in Indonesian politics’, Working 
Paper No 45. Perth: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University. 
Pocock, J.G.A. (1985) Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rapkin, David P. and Jonathan R. Strand (1997) ‘The US and Japan in the Bretton Woods 
institutions: sharing or contesting leadership?’, International Journal LII: 265–96. 
Ravenhill, John (1995) ‘Competing logics of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific’, Journal of 
European Integration 18 (2–3): 179–99. 
 29
Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1996) ‘Exploring the nature of the beast: international relations theory 
and comparative policy analysis meet the European Union’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies 34 (1): 53–79. 
Robison, Richard (1996) ‘Introduction’, in R. Robison (ed.), The Pacific Review 9 (3): 305–8. 
Special issue on: ‘Politics and economics in the twenty-first century: is there an Asian 
model?’. 
Rodan, Garry (1997) ‘Civil society and other political possibilities in Asia’, Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 27 (2): 156–78. 
— (1996) ‘State-society relations and political opposition in Singapore’, In G. Rodan (ed.), 
Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, London: Routledge, pp. 95–127. 
Rose, Nikolas (1988) ‘Calculable minds and manageable individuals’, History of the Human 
Sciences 1 (2): 179–200. 
Rose, Nikolas and Peter Miller (1992) ‘Political power beyond the state: problematics of 
government’, British Journal of Sociology, 43 (2): 173–205. 
Ruggie, John Gerard (1993) ‘Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in 
international relations’, International Organization 47 (1): 139–74. 
Sandholtz, Wayne and John Zysman (1990) ‘1992: recasting the European bargain’, World 
Politics 42: (1): 95–128. 
Streek, Wolfgang (1997) ‘German capitalism: does it exist? can it survive?’, New Political 
Economy 2 (2): 237–56. 
Steven, Rob (1996) Japan and the New World Order: Global Investments, Trade and Finance, 
New York: St Martin’s Press. 
Teubner, Gunter ( 1983) ‘Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law’, Law and Society 
Review 17 (2): 239–86. 
Thompson, Grahame (1992) The evolution of the managed economy in Europe’, Economy and 
Society 21 (2): 129–51. 
Tribe, Keith (1984) ‘Cameralism and the science of government’, Journal of Modern History 56: 
263–84. 
Wade, Robert (1996) ‘Japan, the World Bank, and the art of paradigm maintenance: the East 
Asian miracle in political perspective’, New Left Review 217: 3–36. 
— (1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Williamson, John (1994) ‘In search of a manual for technopols’, in J. Williamson (ed.), The 
Political Economy of Policy Reform. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
pp. 11-28. 
Woods, Lawrence (1993) Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organisations and 
International Relations, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press 
World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
